Achieving water quality goals will necessitate goals. Second, uniform restrictions achieve a adoption of best management practices (BMP's) given level of total abatement at a higher reby some or all farmers.l Water quality is exsource cost than taxes on pollution emissions or pected to improve as farmers adopt BMP's such subsidies on pollution abatement. The fact that as conservation cropping systems, structural soil loss standards are more costly (excluding measures, and conservation tillage methods.
administrative costs) than taxes or subsidies is Currently, there is an absence of pollution not new (Randall, . However, some abatement incentives strong enough to induce states have adopted soil loss standards (some farmers to abate sediment, nutrients, and pesbeing accompanied by cost-sharing programs) ticides to desirable social levels. Although a speand it appears that many other states may do the cific socially optimal level of pollutants may be same (Harder et al.) . An alternative policy to unidifficult (or impossible) to quantify, the U.S.
form restrictions, taxes, and subsidies which has Congress, by passing the Federal Water Pollunot usually been considered is one in which retion Control Act Amendments of 1972 (P. L. 92-strictions are set at different levels for different 500), has demonstrated the need for improvepolluters. The argument presented in this paper ments in water quality. The stated goal of this is that a policy imposing differential restrictions legislation is to eliminate discharges of pollutants may, under certain conditions, be desirable when into navigable waters by 1985. This goal may not efficiency and equity aspects are considered. be achieved in the allotted time period unless incentives of sufficient magnitude and scope One criterion for program acceptance might be centives of sufficient magnitude and scope evolve. Since market forces in the private sector economic efficiency-obtaining the most abatehave not sufficiently reduced pollutant emisment per dollar of costs. The optimum level of sions, public intervention may be needed to creabatement would occur at the point where marginal social cost equals marginal social benefit. ate programs that will alleviate the non-point a soa ot e s social benefit. all sediment deliveries and that the incremental prices would be more harmful to low income costs of abating sediment are directly related to consumers than an increase in income taxes due the quantity of sediment abated. 4 The marginal to the progressive nature of our tax system. Milcosts of abatement for the three farms are the ler and Gill examined the equity consequences of curves MC 1 , MC 2 , and MC 3 . The horizontal applying two different NSP control policies.
summation of these curves is the basin marginal They found that effluent charges result in a more cost of abatement, MCb. equal distribution of net income losses than a One policy may be to restrict per acre delivstatewide soil loss standard applied to all farms.
eries of sediment to some specified amount To the extent that equity considerations are im-(one-half ton per acre, for instance). If the stanportant, the most equitable policy would be predard is less than the quantity being delivered, ferred over other policy alternatives, given the then the farm will have to reduce deliveries. The same level of efficiency. However, there may be restriction level is met when Farm 1 abates OA trade-offs between equity and efficiency.
(delivers AD 1 ) tons, Farm 2 abates OC (delivers The objectives of this paper are: (1) to demon-CD 2 ) tons, and Farm 3 abates OE (delivers ED 3 ) strate graphically that restrictions such as unitons. Distances AD 1 , CD 2 , and ED 3 are equal and form soil loss standards are less efficient and represent the uniform sediment delivery restricequitable than some other NSP control meation level applied to each farm. The total cost of sures; and (2) to empirically investigate effiabatement for any farm is the area under the ciency and equity impacts from various policies marginal cost curve between the origin and the for a river basin in Georgia.
level of abatement. Thus, Farm 1 has the lowest total costs (OAA') and Farm 3 has the highest total costs (OEE') under a uniform restriction THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS policy.
Within the basin, OF tons of sediment have The efficiency and equity aspects of restricbeen abated, leaving deliveries of FDb, an actions, taxes, and subsidies are illustrated in Fig The definition of equity used assumes only one type of societal value judgment. In some instances, equity may imply that the costs of abatement should accrue to those who benefit from the improvement in water quality. In other cases, an equitable policy is one that distributes costs either in proportion to damages or by ability to pay. Much debate centers on the definition of equity when dealing with economic policies. Just, Hueth, and Schmitz state that ". .. equity has to do with how equitable goods are distributed among individuals." This circular definition is of little value in forming a precise meaning of equity. In this paper, however, the most equitable policy is defined as the one resulting in the most equal cost distribution among farmers. This definition is implied by Miller and Gill, also. The authors realize that other distributional impacts may be important, but identifying them is beyond the scope of this research.
In this graph, movements from left to right represent increases in abatement and decreases in emission. As abatement increases, emission decreases. 4 Costs of abatement for this example are defined as losses in net farm revenue accompanying adoption of BMP's. These costs do not include administrative costs or regional income impacts. They only represent the costs to the farm firms of undertaking pollution control practices.
Farm 3 abates less (delivers more) sediment costs. This plan would be less efficient than the under a tax-subsidy policy than under a uniform equi-marginal restrictions policy but might be deregulation policy. Also, the increased costs of sirable if equi-marginal restrictions resulted in Farm 1 are less than the reduced costs of Farm 3 "too wide" a cost distribution. Policy-makers (AA'B'B<DD'E'E). Thus, efficiency is inneed to evaluate the relative trade-offs between creased with a tax-subsidy policy because the efficiency and equity. The preceding discussions total basin abatement costs are reduced. Also, do demonstrate that differential restrictions the tax-subsidy policy is more equitable since applied equi-marginally are more efficient and costs are distributed more evenly among the equitable than uniform per acre restrictions farms. Applying a tax-subsidy policy (identical to applied to all farms. Administrative costs may be applying the equi-marginal principle) is more efdifferent under these two policies. Both policies ficient and equitable than applying a restriction would require monitoring and enforcement at the policy as long as there are differences in either firm level but differential restrictions would requantities of pollution delivered or marginal quire the identification of restriction levels for costs of abatement among farms.
each farm. As this may require substantial costs, In discussing the tax-subsidy policies, a secfarms of similar erosion potential could be aggreond aspect requires consideration. A tax policy gated into separate classifications. Then only imposes additional costs to farmers above the marginal cost of abatement functions for each abatement costs for those units of pollution not classification would be estimated to obtain abated. Thus, farmers must pay taxes for the equi-marginal restriction levels. This is, in fact, quantities of pollution delivered. With a subsidy, the procedure used in the empirical analysis of taxpayers must pay for the quantities of pollution this study. abated, providing a net gain to farmers. These additional costs to either farmers or taxpayers may be substantial. An alternative policy that METHODOLOGY would avoid these additional costs may be needed. One possibility, imposing differential A linear programming model was developed to standards at tax-subsidy equilibrium levels, quantify the economic and environmental quality could be feasible if individual marginal cost impacts from equal restrictions versus differcurves could be estimated. In this example, Farm ential restrictions. Analysis of both solutions re-1 would be restricted to BD 1 tons/acre, Farm 2 to veals the efficiency and equity aspects of the CD 2 tons/acre, and Farm 3 to DD 3 tons/acre.
proposed policies. This solution would maintain the efficiency and
The model includes an objective function to equity properties of tax-subsidy policies without maximize annual returns to land, management, imposing additional costs to farmers or overhead, and risk. Activities were either crop taxpayers. Farmers would, however, pay the asproduction, crop selling, or terrace construction. sociated pollution abatement costs unless costObjective function coefficients for the crop sharing was made available, production activities were the negative total Iowa has enacted a sediment control law which costs of producing one acre of that crop. 5 The sets different soil loss limits for different land yields for these crop production activities were classes. However, cost-sharing assistance is transferred to the selling activities and sold at made available to the landowner to cover at least 1979 prices. Unterraced land could become ter-75 percent of the cost of installing permanent soil raced at a specified cost through use of transfer and water conservation practices (Greiner) .
rows. Objective function coefficients for the terForster and Becker used differential soil loss rerace construction activities were negative, and strictions based on the soil loss tolerance factor represented the cost of converting unterraced (T-value) in their model. These T-values vary beland to terraced land on a per acre basis. Cost tween soil types and are used to approximate the and yield estimates were developed from inforideal standard which equates marginal costs mation provided by the Cooperative Extension across all producers. Soil loss standards set acService, University of Georgia, and the Soil cording to T-values would be more efficient and Conservation Service. equitable than uniform standards. However, the The study area was the Altamaha River Basin problem of actual sediment delivery and other in Georgia (Figure 2 ). Sediment delivery is more forms of pollutants still remains. As noted belikely to occur in the Piedmont than in the fore, restricting soil loss may not necessarily Coastal Plains because the Piedmont has more achieve the optimal level of water quality, erosive, steeper sloping soils and a larger sediDifferential restrictions could be structured so ment delivery ratio. This basin was classified into that all farmers pay identical pollution abatement seven soil resource groups (SRG's) on the basis were estimated by using the Universal Soil Loss Efficiency of a policy can be measured in
,____ ~____________terms of total basin net income per unit of sediment abatement. That is, given alternative policies which generate equal abatement, the one of comparable agronomic and erodibility characp w g e teristics. 6 Two of the SRG's ( A and B) wee lproviding the largest net income for the whole teristics. 6 Two Of the SRG's (A and B) were located in. the Piedmont province and five of the basin is the most efficient policy. The distribucated in the Piedmont province and five of the tion of costs provides the means by which equity SRG's (C through G) were in the Coastal Plains tion of costs provides the means by which equity regi T ros c ere e coa c n can be measured. In this study, the distribution region. The crops considered were corn, cotton, of costs imposed on each SRG is developed for peanuts, and soybeans. Alternative BMP's avail-.. e f peanuts, and soean. Alternative BP's aboth policies. Using the standard deviation of the able in the model included straight or contour cost distributions, the most equitable policy is row farming with or without terraces under conthe one hih results in te l t s d . ,° . ....~ . . .r\ \ the one which results in the lowest standard deventional or conservation tillage methods. Only viation. corn and soybeans could be grown under conservation tillage methods. Conservation tillage yields were assumed to equal 95 percent of con-RESULTS ventional tillage yields. Also, alternative twoyear crop rotation systems were available. Corn Net revenues and sediment deliveries derived and peanuts could have a winter grass cover of using the linear programming model for each of rye while soybeans could have been doublethe three situations are presented in Table 1 . Imcropped with wheat. A total of 464 cropping acpacts from both the equal and equi-marginal retivities were included in the model. Crop strictions were more severe in the Piedmont acreages within each SRG were constrained to SRG's (A and B). This is because the Piedmont is levels established in 1979. If environmental conmore erosive and delivers a higher percentage of straints become stringent, cropland could be sediment than the Coastal Plains. taken out of production.
Overall efficiency between the equal restricErosion rates for each production activity tions and the equi-marginal restrictions can be 6 An SRG is not necessarily a continuous or contiguous land area. Each SRG corresponds to a major soil type found within the basin. These soil types occur somewhat haphazardly throughout the basin, making it difficult to delineate each one on a map such as the one in Figure 2 . The major soil types within each SRG are: A-Cecil; B-Pacolet; C-Norfolk; D-Dothan; E-Cowarts; F-Chewacla; and G-Lakeland.
7 There is nothing "special" about restricting sediment delivery to one-half ton per acre. In fact, other restriction levels were analyzed and results from those models demonstrate that equi-marginal restrictions are more efficient and more equitable than equal restrictions. To conserve space, only the one-half ton per acre restriction results are presented.
8 Applying the restriction to a whole SRG assumes that all land within that SRG is identical in terms of erosion potential as well as costs of abatement. In aggregate models such as this one, however, it is necessary to make this assumption because focusing on individual production units (or on each acre within the basin) would be prohibitively costly. Soils within an SRG do have similar environmental characteristics such as slope, erodibility, and productivity. It may be useful to consider the river basin as being composed of seven "farms." Soil similarities are found within an SRG, bqt soil differences occur between SRG's. (Table 3 ). In the baseline solution, all land was planted in straight rows with conventional tillage.
a The top number in each row corresponds to equal restric-A one-half ton per acre restriction applied to tions. The number in parentheses corresponds to equieach SRG resulted in conservation tillage methmarginal restrictions. ods being used as well as land being taken out of crop production in SRG's A, B, and G. Contour whenever possible and terraces were not conrows with conventional tillage were present in all structed in any solutions.
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areas except SRG C. Soybeans-wheat double cropping was used extensively but winter covers CONCL of rye were only used in SRG E. Equi-marginal LU restrictions allowed more land to stay in producGiven that policy-makers strive for efficiency tion and caused all land to be under contour and equity, economists must consider both asrows. Two-year crop rotations were used pects when analyzing a proposed policy. In this study, theory was reviewed and analysis was this situation, the most efficient solution would conducted demonstrating that in the absence of be to locate the damaged areas, locate the administrative costs, an equi-marginal approach sources of those damages, and restrict sediment is more efficient and equitable than equal per delivery from those sources. As Moldenhauer acre restrictions. When compared to an equal reand Onstad point out, pollution control may be striction policy, an equi-marginal restriction polrequired at watershed outlets, farm boundaries, icy allows high-level polluters to deliver more or the farm itself. Depending on the circumsediment, but requires low-level polluters to destances, levels of control at these three locations liver less sediment. If differential restrictions could vary. Efficient minimization of offsite which equate marginal costs could be determined damages from NSP requires knowledge concernat the farm level (or even at a sub-basin level), ing the pollutant source. Any NSP control policy then costs would be distributed more evenly should require only sources causing damages to among the polluters, and aggregate basin costs incur costs. Results from this study would be difwould decline. Administrative costs, although ferent if locations of damaged areas and sources not estimated in this study, could be different of that damage had been incorporated in the under these two policies. Information concerning model. The theoretical conclusions, however, administrative costs could help policy-makers would still be valid. That is, equi-marginal redecide on the most desirable policy.
strictions applied to sources causing damages In this research, two assumptions were imwould be more efficient and equitable (for that plicitly used which, if false, could alter the empirsubset of sources causing damages) than equal ical results. These assumptions were: (1) damper acre restrictions. Certainly, more effort is ages from a unit of sediment in one location are needed in determining areas where water quality equal to damages from other units of sediment in damage is present, quantitatively or monetarily any other location, and (2) each acre of cropland measuring the damage, and locating the sources within the basin causes sediment damage. Possiof damage. These activities might require subbly, in a large river basin, sediment damage stantial administrative costs, but could reduce would occur unevenly. Also, the sources of the aggregate pollution control costs borne by farmdamage would vary from location to location. In ers.
